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Abstract
Rust is a popular programming language in building
various low-level software in recent years. It aims
to provide safe concurrency when implementing multi-
threaded software through a suite of compiler checking
rules. Unfortunately, there is limited understanding of
how the checking rules influence the safety of concurrent
programming in Rust applications.
In this paper, we perform a preliminary study on
Rust’s concurrency safety from two aspects: concur-
rency usage and concurrency bugs. Our study can pro-
vide better understanding on Rust’s concurrency and can
guide future researchers and practitioners in writing bet-
ter, more reliable Rust software and in developing debug-
ging and bug detection tools for Rust.
1 Introduction
Rust is a programming language designed to build effi-
cient and safe low-level software [12, 13, 26, 28, 31].
Rust is targeted to achieve performance that is compa-
rable to C, while avoiding many safety issues in C in-
cluding both concurrency bugs and memory safety bugs.
Over the past few years, Rust has gained significant pop-
ularity, especially in building low-level software [23–
25]. These Rust applications range from simple li-
braries [2] and utilities [4, 5] to complex browsers [1, 7]
and operating systems [6, 8, 10].
A major design goal of Rust is to provide safe concur-
rency [26, 28]. To achieve the goal, Rust leverages sev-
eral unique ownership rules, and imposes the rule check-
ing during compilation. It is thus widely believed that
Rust is much safer than many other languages. As stated
in Rust’s official tutorial, “concurrency is fearlesss” in
Rust. Since Rust is widely used to implement low-level
systems, it is important to understandwhether these com-
piler rules can really reduce concurrency bugs and pro-
vide safer concurrency.
Unfortunately, there is only limited prior work in un-
derstanding Rust’s concurrency. Many key questions are
left open. For example, how does Rust’s compiler rules
influence its programmability? Will developers have to
use unsafe code to bypass compiler checkings? What
are the commonmistakes made by developers when they
develop multithreaded Rust programs? Will bypassing
Rust’s compiler checkings introduce concurrency bugs?
Will there be no concurrency bugs in safe code? The
lack of knowledge in Rust’s concurrency would severely
impair Rust software development and make it hard to
create Rust development and debugging tools.
In this paper, we conduct the first empirical study on
Rust’s concurrency. Our study focuses on two main as-
pects, concurrency usage (Section 3) and concurrency
bugs (Section 4). We conduct our study on three popular
open-sourceRust applications: Servo [7], a web browser,
TiKV [9], a key-value storage system, and Rand [2], a
random number generation library.
Although our study is just preliminary, we are already
able to identify interesting new findings and insights in
Rust concurrent programming. For example, we find that
there are still data race bugs in safe Rust code and Rust
programmers should not rely solely on Rust’s compiler
checkings and be “fearless” in writing concurrent Rust
programs. Another interesting finding is Rust’s compiler
checkings do restrict its programmability and change de-
velopers’ usage habits of concurrency primitives.
Overall, we make four observations in our study of
concurrent programming in Rust and infer four impli-
cations that can be useful for future Rust programmers
and language designers. For example, future research in
building Rust bug detectors should focus on unsafe code
and atomic operations in safe code. Our findings and im-
plications improve the understanding of Rust’s concur-
rency and guide future tool design.
2 Background
In this section, we give a brief overview of Rust, its
mechanism for concurrency safety, and its thread com-
munication and synchronization mechanisms.
2.1 Rust and Rust-Based Software
Rust is a low-level system programming language, firstly
designed by Graydon Hoare in 2006. Rust has been
sponsored and maintained by Mozilla since 2009 and
was firstly released in 2010 [31]. Providing safe con-
currency [26, 28] and safe memory [12] with similar per-
formance to C [13] is the design goal of Rust. In recent
years, due to its safety and performance benefits, Rust
draws many interests from developers. According to sur-
veys on stack overflow, Rust is the most beloved pro-
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gramming language in the last three years [23–25]. Rust
has become a popular language in building software sys-
tems, such as browsers [1, 7] and OSes [6, 8, 10].
Application Stars Commits Contributors LOC History
Servo [7] 13150 35876 915 254K 5.9 Years
TiKV [9] 4381 3345 121 119K 2.0 Years
Rand [2] 359 1981 170 11K 7.5 Years
Table 1: Information of selected applications. The
number of stars, commits, and contributors on GitHub, total
source lines of code, and development history on GitHub.
In this paper, we select three popular open-source
Rust projects on GitHub to conduct our study (Table 1).
According to the number of stars on GitHub, Servo is
ranked 4th, TiKV is ranked 19th, and Rand is ranked
in the top 3% among all Rust projects. They cover dif-
ferent types of functionalities, including web browsing
(Servo), key-value storage (TiKV), and library utility
(Rand). They are of medium to large size and have at
least two years’ development history. We believe that
these three applications are good representatives of real-
world usage of Rust and leave exploring other Rust ap-
plications to future work.
2.2 Static Ownership Checking
Rust supports shared variables between threads. By de-
fault, one Rust value has exact one variable as its owner,
and a value will be destroyed, if its owner variable leaves
its scope. Rust’s compiler conducts static ownership
checking on shared variables, with the hope to reduce
mistakes during accessing shared variables.
First, the ownership of a value can be moved from one
scope to another, through function call or return, mes-
sage passing, thread creation, and so on. Rust com-
piler statically guarantees that an owner variable will not
be accessed after the ownership is moved to a different
scope. Therefore, a shared value can only be owned by
one thread at any time.
Second, Rust supports accessing a value using its ref-
erence. A reference can be borrowed from one scope
to another, without moving ownership. Rust’s com-
piler does not allow references to be borrowed between
threads, since values’ lifetime cannot be statically in-
ferred across threads and Rust’s compiler guarantees a
value’s lifetime covers all its reference usage.
Third, to have multiple owner threads, Rust provides
a thread-safe reference-counting pointer (Arc). Rust’s
compiler guarantees that all owner threads only access
an Arc to read a shared variable or update a shared vari-
able through Arc::make mut(), which will create a per-
thread private copy of the shared variable.
Fourth, to allow multiple threads to update the same
copy, a shared variable has to be declared with both Arc
and Mutex. To access the shared variable, a thread needs
to invoke the lock function of the shared variable’s pro-
tecting Mutex. A reference of the shared variable is re-
turned after successfully invoking the lock function, so
that the thread can read or write the shared variable. Mu-
tual exclusion provided by Mutex guarantees that there is
at most one thread accessing a shared value at any time.
2.3 Thread Synchronization in Rust
Thread Model. Rust does not provide any runtime to
manage thread scheduling. Rust threads are mapped
to OS threads in an 1 to 1 way. To create a thread,
thread::spawn() function is invoked with a piece of
code (a closure) as parameter. Ownership of shared vari-
ables can be moved from a creating thread to a created
thread during thread creation.
Thread Synchronization. Similar to C/C++, Rust sup-
ports traditional synchronization primitives designed
to protect shared memory accesses, such as lock
(Mutex), read/write lock (RwLock), conditional vari-
able (Condvar), atomic operations (atomic), and barrier
(Barrier). There are three difference between Mutex
(or RwLock) in Rust and in C/C++. First, Rust pro-
vides a poisoning mechanism [3] for Mutex to propagate
panic information among threads. Second, Rust requires
a Mutex to be declared together with its protected data.
Third, there is no explicit unlock function in Rust, and
Rust’s compiler automatically adds unlock at the end of
a scope with lock operations. Rust provides Once as a
new primitive to guarantee the initializations of a global
variable is only conducted once.
Rust provides channel to pass messages between
threads. Each channel has a sender and a receiver.
Ownership can be moved from sender thread to receiver
thread through message passing. When channel buffer is
empty, pulling data from the channel will block.
3 Usage Study
In this section, we discuss our study results on concur-
rency usage in Rust applications, including the usage of
unsafe code and the usage of synchronization primitives.
3.1 Unsafe Code
Rust supports unsafe keyword to mark a function or a
code scope to bypass some compiler checkings. As dis-
cussed in Section 2.2, many static compiler checkings
are designed to avoid concurrency bugs. Therefore, the
usage of unsafe is highly correlated with whether Rust
can really achieve safe concurrency.
We first study the amount of unsafe tags. As shown
in Table 2, there are a fair amount of unsafe tags in the
2
Application
# of unsafe tags LOC
fn scope total # per KLOC average percentage total
Servo 31.72% 68.27% 1683 6.62 6.08 4.19% 254K
TiKV 11.70% 88.29% 94 0.78 5.62 0.44% 119K
Rand 0 100.00% 47 4.27 3.63 1.55% 11K
Table 2: unsafe Usage. In the # of unsafe tags columns,
fn and scope: the ratio of unsafe used to tag a function
or a code scope, and total: the total number of unsafe. In
the LOC columns, average: the average LOC tagged by an
unsafe, and percentage: unsafe code over total code.
three studied applications, ranging from 47 to 1683. We
calculate the average number of unsafe tags over total
source lines of code. On average, Servo developers use
unsafemost frequently, and there are 6.62 unsafe tags
per thousand lines of code. TiKV has the smallest num-
ber, and there is less than one unsafe tag per thousand
lines of code. unsafe can be used to mark a function or
a code scope. For the three studied applications, unsafe
is constantly used more often to tag a code scope, rang-
ing from 68.27% to 100.00% over all unsafe usage sites
for the three applications. The large number of unsafe
tags demonstrates that Rust’s compiler checkings do re-
strict its programmability, encouraging programmers to
bypass them using unsafe. These unsafe sites can po-
tentially contain concurrency bugs, making Rust’s con-
currency less safe, as we will discuss in Section 4.3.
We then count the lines of code inside each code scope
or function tagged with unsafe. As shown in Table 2, on
average, an unsafe is used to tag a very small piece of
code. For Servo, each unsafe tags 6.08 lines of code on
average, which is the largest number among the three ap-
plications. The number drops to 5.62 and 3.63 for TiKV
and Rand respectively. These results show that Rust de-
velopers are very careful when they use unsafe.
In the end, we count the percentage of unsafe code
over all code. As shown in Table 2, the percentage of
unsafe code ranges from 0.44% to 4.19% for the three
studied applications. For Rust applications, safe code
dominates.
Observation 1: The majority of code in Rust applica-
tions is safe. However, Rust developers often need to
carefully use unsafe to bypass compiler checkings.
Implication 1: Compiler checkings do restrict Rust’s
programmability. Future works on more precise com-
piler checkings to give developers more flexibility and
verifying unsafe code in Rust to provide a certain level
of confidence in safety are needed.
3.2 Concurrency Usage
Studying the usage of concurrency primitives can help
understand how Rust developers implement thread com-
munication and synchronization, and quantitatively get a
feeling about which primitives are more likely to be mis-
used, leading to concurrency bugs.
Application
Shared Memory Message Passing
Total
Mutex RwLock Once Condvar atomic channel
Servo 14.42% 12.16% 0.21% 0% 11.66% 61.52% 1414
TiKV 8.40% 12.36% 0.09% 18.69% 18.69% 42.43% 1011
Rand 6.25% 15.62% 9.37% 0% 62.5% 6.25% 32
Table 3: Concurrency Primitives Usage.
We count the number of operations for each primitive
type. For example, for Mutex, we count the number of
Mutex.lock() and Mutex.try lock() operations. As
shown in Table 3, channel is the most widely used prim-
itive for two applications. For Servo, 62.52% of synchro-
nization operations are channel operations. For TiKV,
the percentage is 42.53%. For Rand, its most widely
used primitive is atomic, and the percentage is 62.5%
over all primitive types. For multithreaded programs in
other languages, mutex is the most widely used prim-
itive [29, 30, 33]. However, this is not true for Rust.
We anticipate that it is Rust’s compiler checkings that
change developers’ programming habits and usage pat-
terns when building Rust concurrent software.
We also calculate the average number of concurrency
operations over lines of code. TiKV developers use con-
currency operations most frequently, and there are 8.49
concurrency operations for every thousand lines of code.
Servo developers use concurrency operations less fre-
quently, and Rand developers use concurrency opera-
tions least frequently. The average operations per one
thousand lines of code are 5.56 and 2.90 for these two
applications respectively.
Observation 2: The usage of concurrency primitive in
Rust is different from other programming languages, pos-
sibly caused by Rust’s compiler checking mechanism.
Implication 2: Traditional concurrency bug detection
and fixing techniques focus more on Mutex. Future re-
search works should pay more attention to channel and
atomic to combat concurrency bugs in Rust.
4 Concurrency Bug Study
This section presents a preliminary study of Rust con-
currency bugs. Specifically, we will first introduce our
methodology of collecting and categorizing bugs and
then present our identified deadlock and data-race bugs.
4.1 Methodology
To collect concurrency bugs, we first search for the key-
words “deadlock” and “race” in GitHub commit histories
of the three applications in Table 1. These two keywords
are widely used in previous works to collect concurrency
bugs in other programming languages [17, 19, 22, 29].
Many previous works categorize concurrency bugs into
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deadlock bugs and non-deadlock bugs [14, 20, 22]. Data
race is one of the common types of non-deadlock bugs.
Application
Deadlock Data Race
Mutex channel safe unsafe
Servo 5 3 1 5
TiKV 2 0 1 0
Rand 0 0 1 0
Total 7 3 3 5
Table 4: Taxonomy. This table shows how our studied bugs
distribute across different categories and applications.
We then manually inspect the resulting commits that
contain the two keywords to identify real concurrency
bugs. In the last step, we study identified concurrency
bugs, by referring their patches and related discussions
on GitHub. Right now, we have studied 18 bugs. Their
detailed distribution is shown in Table 4.
4.2 Rust Deadlock Bugs
In total, we study 10 deadlock bugs. We categorize
them based on which synchronization primitives causing
threads not to make future progress. As shown in Table 4,
due to implicit unlock in Rust, double locks are the root
causes for seven deadlocks. The other three deadlocks
are caused by misusing channel.
1 pub fn insert_rule(...) -> Fallible<u32> {
2 - let mut guard = stylesheet.shared_lock.write();
3 - let new_rule = rules.write_with(&mut guard)?;
4 + let new_rule = {
5 + let mut guard = stylesheet.shared_lock.write();
6 + rules.write_with(&mut guard)?
7 + }
8 ...
9 let dom_rul = CSSRule::new_specific(...);
10 }
11
12 pub fn new_specific(...) -> Root<CSSRule> {
13 ...
14 let guard = stylesheet.shared_lock().read();
15 }
Figure 1: A deadlock caused by double RwLock. The
code has been simplified to ease our explannation.
Implicit Unlock. Rust does not provide any unlock func-
tion. Rust’s compiler automatically adds corresponding
unlock functions at the end of a scope with lock func-
tions. Due to this, Rust developers may forget to release
acquired lock timely, leading to double-lock deadlocks.
One bug example from Servo is shown in Figure 1.
sheet.shared lock is a RwLock. The write lock is ac-
quired at line 2. The write lock is only needed for the in-
vocation of function write with(), but it is not released
until the end of function insert rule() at line 10. Un-
fortunately, insert rule() invokes new specific()
at line 9. new specific() acquires the read lock of the
RwLock at line 14, leading to a double-lock bug. To fix
this bug, Servo developers simply add a pair of {} to cre-
ate a new scope, so that the write lock can be released
after invoking write with() at line 7.
1 while !done {
2 match r1.recv(){
3 Some(Exit(...)) => {
4 done = true;
5 ...
6 }
7 Some(SetID(s2)) => {
8 s2.send(());
9 }
10 ...
11 }
12 }
13
14 let (s3, r3) = channel();
15 s2.send(ExitMsg(s3));
16 r3.recv(); //blocks
(a) master thread
1 loop {
2 let request = r2.recv();
3 match request {
4 ExitMsg(s3) => {
5 ...
6 s3.send(());
7 break;
8 }
9 ReadyMsg(...) => {
10 ...
11 let (s2, r2) = channel();
12 s1.send(SetID(s2))
13 r2.recv() //blocks
14 }
15 }
16 }
(b) worker thread
Figure 2: A deadlock caused by circularly waiting for
message between two threads. s: sender; r: receiver;
numbers after s or r are used to match sender and receiver.
Misusing Channel. As shown in Table 3, channel is
widely used in Rust programs. When buffer is empty,
pulling data from a channel will block, forming an edge
from receiver thread to sender thread in wait-for graph.
A circle in wait-for graph means circular wait among
threads and deadlock. We have three bugs caused by cir-
cular wait involving waiting for channel message.
One example from Servo is shown in Figure 2. There
are two threads, master thread and worker thread. Both
of them have a message-processing loop to handle mes-
sages from r1 and r2 respectively. In Figure 2b, when
work thread wants to set its ID, it creates a channel at line
11, send the sender s2 of the created channel in a SetID
message to master thread at line 12, and blocks itself to
wait for reply frommaster thread at line 13. In Figure 2a,
when master thread receives a SetID message from r1,
it replies work thread by sending an empty message ()
using s2 to unblock worker thread. When master thread
receives an Exitmessage at line 3, it leaves the message-
handling loop at line 4. After that, master thread notifies
worker thread to exit at line 15, and blocks itself to wait
for a reply from worker thread at line 16. Worker thread
can unblock master thread by sending out an empty mes-
sage () at line 6 in Figure 2b.
This bug happens when master thread receives an
Exit message just before worker thread sends out a
SetID message. Master thread blocks at line 16 in Fig-
ure 2a waiting for a message should be sent from work
thread at line 6 in Figure 2b. However, worker thread
blocks at line 13 in Figure 2b, waiting for master thread
to unblock it by execution line 8 in Figure 2a. To fix this
bug, Servo developers change master thread, and only al-
low it to leave the message-processing loop after worker
thread has exit, so that master thread can always handle
messages from worker thread.
Observation 3: Double locks and misusing channels are
two common causes of deadlocks in Rust.
Implication 3: To detect deadlocks in Rust, it is useful
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to design static analysis which can identify possible lock
operations in a function call and can infer thread wait
relationship based on inter-thread messaging.
4.3 Rust Data Races
Intuitively, there could be data races inside unsafe code.
Our study confirms this intuition. In total, five out of
eight races are caused by instructions inside unsafe code.
However, what is counter-intuitive is that there are still
races inside safe code.
Data Races in Safe Code. Rust supports shared variables
in atomic types, such as AtomicBool, AtomicPtr, and
AtomicUsize. Read and write conducted on atomic
variables are automatically ignored by Rust’s ownership
checkings. All races in safe code are caused by misusing
atomic operations.
1 - static CHECKED: AtomicBool = ATOMIC_BOOL_INIT;
2 + static CHECKER: Once = ONCE_INIT;
3 static AVAILABLE: AtomicBool = ATOMIC_BOOL_INIT;
4
5 fn is_getrand_available() -> bool {
6 - if !CHECKED.load(Ordering::Relaxed) {
7 + CHERKER.call_once(|| {
8 let mut buf: [u8; 0] = [];
9 let result = getrand(&mut buf);
10 let available = if result == -1 {
11 ...
12 } else {
13 true
14 };
15 AVAILABLE.store(available, Ordering::Relaxed);
16 - CHECKED.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
17 - available
18 - } else {
19 - AVAILABLE.load(Ordering::Relaxed)
20 }
21 AVAILABLE.load(Ordering::Relaxed)
22 }
Figure 3: An atomicity violation bug in safe code.
An example from Rand is shown in Figure 3. Func-
tion is getrand available() invokes getrand() at
line 7, and checks whether the returned value is -1
at line 8 to decide whether getrand() is available.
getrand() is an expensive system call, so that Rand
developers decide to cache the previous execution re-
sult. Since is getrand available() can be ex-
ecuted concurrently, two atomic variables, CHECKED
and AVAILABLE, are introduced to achieve the caching
functionality. CHECKED represents whether getrand()
is called before, and AVAILABLE represents whether
getrand() is available. If CHECKED is false at line
5, getrand() will be called at line 7, AVAILABLE will
be set to suitable value at line 13, and CHECKED will be
set to true at line 14. If CHECKED is true at line 5, the
value of AVAILABLEwill be returned at line 19.
There is a concurrency bug that can cause
is getrand available() to return incorrect re-
sults. Since either compiler or CPU could reorder
the execution of line 13 and line 14, if the reordering
happens, the caching mechanism is only correct when
line 14 and line 13 are executed atomically. If the
execution of line 14 and line 13 of one thread is inter-
leaved by the execution of line 5 and line 19 of another
thread, is getrand available() will return false,
no matter getrand() is available or not. To fix this
bug, Rand developers use Once primitive to guarantee
the invocation of getrand() and the initialization of
AVAILABLE are only conducted once and are conducted
atomically.
Observation 4: Unsafe code is indeed one major source
of data races in Rust. However, there are also data races
from safe code.
Implication 4: Race detection techniques are needed for
Rust, and they should focus on unsafe code and atomic
operations in safe code.
5 Related Works
Many system reliability researchers conducted empiri-
cal studies on real-world bugs before [11, 14–18, 21, 22,
27, 29, 32]. These works have successfully guided tech-
niques to combat bugs from various aspects. To the best
of our knowledge, our work is the first empirical study
on Rust concurrency usage and concurrency bugs. Al-
though it is still at an initial stage, our current results can
inspire and guide future techniques for concurrency bugs
in Rust.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
With the increasing usage of Rust to implement various
concurrent systems, it is important to understandwhether
Rust’s static compiler checkings can really bring safe
concurrency. We conduct the first study on Rust con-
currency from two aspects: concurrency usage and real-
world concurrency bugs. We expect our study to deepen
the understanding of Rust’s concurrency and motivate
more research works on Rust.
This paper is just a starting point to understand Rust.
We plan to extend the current work from the following
directions.
First, more concurrency bugs should be collected from
a wider range of Rust applications. We should build
a more comprehensive taxonomy for Rust concurrency
bugs from various aspects, such as root causes, fix strate-
gies, how bugs are introduced, and so on.
Second, we plan to systematically evaluate existing
concurrency bug detection techniques on Rust. Rust uses
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LLVM as its backend and doesn’t have any runtime. It
is fairly easy to apply existing techniques designed for
C/C++ to Rust applications. Since Rust has message-
passing mechanisms, existing techniques are expected to
be extended to have more precise detection results.
Third, safe memory usage is another design goal of
Rust. We plan to extend our study to memory bugs in
Rust and understand whether Rust’s compiler checkings
can really reduce memory bugs. Many memory bugs can
be exploited by hackers have large security impact. We
also plan to evaluate security impact of memory bugs in
Rust.
Four, Rust is a very young language, and new language
features were added in recent years. We plan to study
new language features influence Rust’s programmability
and its safety.
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